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I.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Jurisdiction of district court and other
courts—Right of appeal. The district court
shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution
or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided l?y
statute.
The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall
be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 5.
II.
ARGUMENT
A.
Appeal.

This Court

is Fully Empowered

to Adjudicate Hood's

Appellee, Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial")
argues at pages 15-18 of its Brief that Appellant Hood Corporation
("Hood") "has no business before this Court."

Industrial's major

premise, made without any citation to authority, is that Judge
Young functioned as nothing more than an arbitrator.

Its minor

premise, also made without any citation to authority, is that in
his capacity as an "arbitrator," Judge Young's decision is subject
to

the

same

deferential

review

accorded

arbitral

awards.

Industrial's premises are flawed, and this Court should reject
Industrial's argument for the following reasons:

1

1.

Industrial's Suggested Rule is Unconstitutional.
Article VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution provides,

in pertinent part:

"Except for matters filed originally with the

Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause."

(Emphasis added).

Judge David S.

Young is a judge, not an arbitrator. In that capacity, Judge Young
entered a judgment in this case.

The Constitution unambiguously

and explicitly gives Hood "an appeal of right" from that judgment.
Even if the Stipulation purported to waive the
parties' constitutional right to appeal, which it does not do, the
Stipulation does not free this Court from its constitutional duty
to review Judge Young's judgment because stipulations between
litigants do not bind courts "when points of law requiring judicial
determination are involved."

First of Denver Mortg. Investors v.

C.N. Zundel and Assoc, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979); Mooney v. GR
and Assoc. , 746 P.2d 1174, 1178 n.3 (Utah App. 1987). The one case
other than Zundel relied on by this Court in Mooney explains why
this Court is obligated to consider the merits of Hood's appeal
irrespective of the parties7 Stipulation:
A stipulation cannot be used to bind a court
in the determination of questions of law or
mixed questions of law and fact.
On the
contrary, it always remains the independent
responsibility of the court to decide the law
applicable to a particular case and the legal
sufficiency of the evidence in regard to a
contested claim.
Bar 70 Enter., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1306 (Colo.
1985)(En Banc.)(cited in Mooney, 746 P.2d at p. 1178 n.3).
2

2.
The Parties Never Contemplated that the Stipulation
Would Divest Hood of its Constitutional Right of Appeal,
On January 11, 1993 Industrial filed its memorandum
responding

to

Hood's

attorneys' fees.

motion

for

(R. 3438-43).

a

hearing

on

Industrial's

In its memorandum, Industrial

wrote:
Given the protracted history of this cas6 and
the litigious stance Hood has unabashedly
adopted throughout, it is almost certain that
Hood will appeal almost any judgment or award.
If the court believes, in its discretion, that
a hearing on the reasonableness of Industrial
Indemnity's fees will minimize the prospect of
further proceedings and thus reduce the
accrual of additional costs and fees to any
significant degree, Industrial Indemnity has
no objection to such a hearing.
(R. 3439)(emphasis added).
On May 26, 1993, while this appeal was still pending before
the Utah Supreme Court, Industrial filed its Motion for Summary
Disposition Affirming Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees.

In

that motion, Industrial again said nothing about Hood's purported
inability to appeal.

Instead, at pages 9-10, Industrial wrote:

Stripped of the unfounded and unjustifiable
overstatements of the Docketing Statement, and
of issues that are not raised by or even
relevant to this case, Hood's Docketing
Statement reveals no specific challenge to any
of these factual findings, other than the
ultimate
conclusion
or
reasonableness.
Against the highly-deferential "abuse of
discretion" standard applicable to findings of
fact fSprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 226
(Utah App. 1991)), there is no significant
issue on the unchallenged facts justifying
more than summary appellate review of the
trial court's exercise of its fact-finding
powers
in
resolving
the
issue
of
reasonableness as anticipated by the governing
Stipulation.
3

*

*

*

In fact, the law and standards suggested by
Hood as applicable were properly applied in
the Court's analysis and support the judgment
entered.
There being no substantial or legal basis for
Hoods' [sic] appeal, this is an appropriate
case for summary dismissal.
Industrial never suggested to the trial court or to the
Supreme Court that Hood had no right of appeal. Industrial raised
this claim

for the first time in its brief to this Court.

Industrial's argument is a last-minute and untimely rationalization
without any legal or factual basis.
B. The Trial Court Improperly Afforded Industrial's
Attorneys' Fee Request a Presumption of Reasonableness.
Hood established in its initial brief that attorneys'
fees incurred by Industrial are not entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness.

See Appellant's Brief, pages 8-10.

Industrial

must prove the attorneys' fees claimed are reasonable.

See

Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1361 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Wilson-Jump Company
v. McCarthy-Hundreiser and Assoc. Inc. P 85 111.App.3d 179, 192,
405 N.E.2d 1322, 1325, 40 111. Dec. 230 (App. 1980); Jackson v.
Hollowell,

685

F.2d

961,

966

(5th

Cir

1982).

Industrial

reluctantly acknowledges this burden in its Brief;1 however, at the
industrial states: "[i]n the end, however, Industrial did not
press that theory [presumption of reasonableness] or argue that
entitlement during the evidentiary hearing. In fact, Industrial's
counsel specifically acknowledged Industrial's burden at the
hearing, stating, 'I suppose we [Industrial] have to prove our fees
are both reasonable and necessary.' [R. 3770]." Appellee's Brief
at page 19.
4

same

time,

it urges

this

Court

to

adopt

a

presumption

of

reasonableness standard based on dated authority (Fidelity and
Guaranty Co, v. Hittle, 96 N.W. 782 (Iowa 1903)) that has not been
followed for several decades.

See Appellee's Brief, pages 20-22.

Industrial's erroneous argument for a presumption of
reasonableness is based in its pleadings requesting attorneys' fees
and costs. (R. 3166, 3397-98, 3441).

According to its argument,

Hood had the burden of proof to establish the unreasonableness of
Industrial's attorneys' fees.
Despite its argument, Industrial claims the trial court
afforded it no presumption of reasonableness, and that Hood's
argument to the contrary is "based solely on an unwarranted twist
on a comment by Judge Young, quoted out of context . . . "
Appellee's Brief, page 19.
statement —

See

Industrial suggests Judge Young's

"[s]o if it [attorneys' fees] begins out as all being

reasonable then the prong that I think that Mr. Anderson is
claiming the right to prevail on is that it, in fact, wasn't
necessary" — merely reflects his understanding of the testimony of
Hood's expert.

See Appellee's Brief, pages 19-20,

Industrial's claim is not supported by the record.

(R.3782).

A close review

of the record reveals Judge Young's basic misunderstanding of
Industrial's burden in establishing the reasonableness of its
attorneys' fees.
Counsel for Industrial stated at the hearing: "With
respect to the presumption of reasonableness issue, I only think
the law in this area is very much in dispute." (R. 3781).
5

Counsel

then proceeded to cite authority in support of a presumption of
reasonableness stating

M

. . . it's not a qu stion of looking back

with hindsight and saying what would have been the best thing to do
looking back. They're [Hood] not entitled t

come here like Monday

morning quarterbacks and say, well, you kn /, this wasn't really
necessary."
of

(R. 3781-82). These statement

reasonableness,

and

contradict

uggest a presumption

Industrial's

begrudging

acknowledgement of its burden of proof at tha evidentiary hearing.
At the same hearing, Hood's expert;, Craig Mariger Esq.,
testified that Industrial's attorneys' fees were reasonable during
certain periods of the litigation and were unreasonable during
other periods based on the factual circumstances of each period.
(R. 3753-3757).

Mr. Mariger did not testify that all attorneys'

fees incurred by Industrial begin as being reasonable.

Indeed,

Hood has argued from the beginning that Industrial must establish
both the reasonableness and necessity of its attorneys' fees.
The trial court's statement that all attorneys' fees
"begin" as reasonable reflects a misunderstanding of Mr. Mariger's
testimony and authority cited by Hood on this issue.

The trial

court erred, as a matter of law, by affording a presumption of
reasonableness to the attorneys' fees incurred by Industrial.
Co The Trial Court Failed To Make Findings of Fact on All
Elements Required Under Existing Law.
Industrial is required to prove the reasonableness of its
attorneys'

fee

request

to

prevent

financial

indemnitor, Hood, under the indemnity agreement.
Hollowell. 685 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir. 1982).
6

abuse

of

its

See Jackson v.

In recognition of

the ever-present

possibility

of unnecessary,

duplicative

and

redundant representation, courts have developed a specific test to
determine if attorneys' fees incurred by an indemnitee satisfy the
reasonableness and necessary standards.

See Perkins v. Thompson,

551 So.2d 204, 209 (Miss. 1989); Central Towers Apartments, Inc. v.
Martin, 61 Tenn. App. 244, 267, 453 S.W.2d 789, 799 (App. 1969).
Industrial claims at pages 21-22 of its Brief that the trial
court's award of attorneys' fees survives the test set forth in
Central Towers.

This claim is, however, not supported because of

the trial court's failure to make findings on several key factors.
Hood established in its initial brief that the trial
court entered no findings of fact on the following key factors of
the Central Towers analysis:

nos. 8 (the cgmpetency of Hood and

James' attorneys); 10 (whether there was a conflict of interest
between Industrial and Hood); 11 (the attitude and cooperativeness
of Industrial) ; and
Industrial).

12

(the diligence

q>f the attorneys

for

Furthermore, the trial court failed to consider (1)

the efficiency of Industrial's attorneys and

(2) the results

obtained by Industrial's attorneys as required under existing Utah
law to determine the reasonableness of a request for attorneys'
fees. See Appellant's Brief, pages 12-17; (pabrera v. Cottrell, 694
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985).
Industrial does not address the trial court's failure to
make findings of fact on these key factors.

Because the findings

are deficient under (1) Utah law; and (2) the standard set forth in
Central Towers, this Court should reverse the award of attorneys'
7

fees to Industrial. See Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801
P.2d

163, 174

because

the

(Utah App. 1990)(attorneys7
trial

court's

findings

fee award reversed

did

not

demonstrate

consideration of "the factors established by appellate courts as
relevant to a reduction in fees.")(emphasis added).

See also.

Matter of Estate of Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282f 286 (Utah App. 1992) ("the
absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of
the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.")
D. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that
Industrial Acted Reasonably in Maintaining a Separate Defense
(Finding of Fact No. 14).
Industrial argues that the evidence marshalled by Hood is
sufficient under an abuse of discretion standard to support the
trial court's findings that (1) Industrial's reasonably retained
separate

counsel; and

reasonable.

(2) all

of

its

attorneys' fees were

See Appellee's Brief, pages 22-24.

Hood has always

acknowledged Industrial reasonably incurred certain attorneys'
fees. On appeal, Hood argues only that the evidence relied upon by
the trial court and presented by Industrial in its Brief fails to
support

(1)

Industrial's

maintenance

of

a

separate

defense

throughout the litigation; and (2) the trial court's award of all
attorneys' fees claimed by Industrial.

The trial court itself

admitted its award was "somewhat arbitrary."

(R. 3800, Add. 74).

In its initial brief, Hood identified certain factors in
the

Central

Towers

decision

critical

to

determining

whether

sufficient evidence exists to support an award of attorneys' fees
8

to a surety pursuant to an indemnity agreement.2

See Appellant's

Brief, pages 19-24; Central Towers, 453 S.W.2d at p. 800.

These

factors led to the reversal of an award of attorneys' fees for a
surety in Central Towers.

They are present in this case, but are

ignored by the trial court and Industrial in its Brief.

Instead,

Industrial relies on five arguments to justify the trial court's
finding of fact no. 14.
Industrial first argues that James' insolvency had a
potential, detrimental impact on Industrial that justifies the
trial

court's

finding.

Industrial's

argument

Industrial's

guarantor,

See Appellee's
is

not
was

valid

Brief,

because

financially

able

pages 24-25.
(1)
to

Hood,

as

indemnify

Industrial throughout the litigation; and (2) by executing the
Stipulation, Industrial consciously and willingly accepted Hood's
guarantee as Industrial's sole security.
Ex. D-15, Add. 75, Add. 24-25.

See Appellant's Brief,

Industrial cannot argue in good

faith that a separate defense was necessary based on its subjective
feelings of insecurity after the date of the Stipulation.
Industrial's second argument is that the defense provided
by

James

independent

was

"never

fully

defenses".

See

co-extensive
Appellee's

with

Brief,

Industrial's
pages

25-27.

Industrial's argument is incorrect. Industrial filed its pleading

2

These factors are: (1) the absence of risk to the surety as
a practical matter; (2) the solvency of the indemnitor (Hood); (3)
the competency of the indemnitor's attorneys who were engaged to
represent the surety's interest; (4) the active defense of the suit
by the indemnitor's attorneys; and (5) the lack of conflict of
interest between the indemnitor and the surety.
9

asserting its independent defenses on September 27, 1987, which
defenses were dismissed by the trial court on May 17, 1988 (R. 96870) . After the dismissal, Industrial's defense was completely coextensive with the defense of James.3

Consequently, Industrial's

claim of independent defenses does not support or justify its
retention of separate counsel throughout the litigation or the
trial court's award of post-Stipulation attorneys' fees.
Third, Industrial argues that Hood's inactivity and
apparent lack of interest in the litigation support the trial
court's finding of fact no. 14. See Appellee's Brief, pages 27-28.
Whether Hood demonstrated adequate interest in the litigation is
immaterial.

Instead, the key is whether Industrial's exposure to

risk justified its maintenance of a separate defense.

Industrial

was never exposed to any risk in the litigation.

Hood, as

Industrial's guarantor, maintained at least a $20 million net worth
throughout the litigation, which was made known to Industrial and
was sufficient to satisfy any judgment on Industrial's $1,128
million bond.

See Appellant's Brief, pages 19-20, Ex. D-15, Add.

75.
Even if Hood's level of interest is properly at issue,
Hood, James and its liability insurers expended approximately
$626,000 in attorneys' fees and expert fees in defense of the

3

0n February 5,
permit Industrial to
available to James.
request on March 20,

1991 Industrial did ask the trial court to
raise an "overpayment defense" allegedly not
(R. 1093-1107). The trial court denied that
1991 (R. 1458-59).
10

litigation.

(R. 3294).

The amount expended by Hood is hardly the

act of an inactive or disinterested party.
In its fourth argument, Industrial states that Hood's
refusal to post collateral supports the trial court's finding of
fact no. 14.

See Appellee's Brief, pages 28-29.

Industrial did

not request collateral from Hood unt^l August 1987.
3602).

(R. 3599-

Following months of negotiations, Hood and Industrial

executed the Stipulation in April, 1988. (R. 902-09, Appellant's
Brief Add. 20-27).

The Stipulation unequivocally states that

Industrial agreed to look only to Hood's net worth for security and
relieved

Hood

of any obligation

to post

collateral.

These

undisputed facts establish only an eight-month window during which
Industrial can plead insecurity, and even that claim is rendered
void by the subsequent Stipulation with no separate security.
Despite

these

facts,

the

trial

court

determined

Industrial acted reasonably in maintaining a separate defense and
awarded Industrial all of its attorneys' fees. In its oral ruling,
the trial court relied

exclusively

on Industrial's perceived

insecurity as the sole basis for finding Industrial's attorneys'
fees reasonable. See Hood's initial brief at pp. 22-24. The trial
court abused its discretion since the posting of collateral was a
non-issue for all but eight months of the litigation.
In its fifth and final argument, Industrial states that
its separate defense and attorneys' fees were reasonable because
Hood did not demand Industrial re-tender its defense until late in
the litigation.

See Appellee's Brief, pages 29-31. This argument
11

is misleading. Reed Brown, counsel for James, requested Industrial
re-tender its defense on August 25, 1987.

(R. 3188).

Industrial

refused to do so and instead demanded that Hood post collateral.
In response to Industrial's demand, Hood and Industrial executed
the Stipulation, which resolved the collateral issue.

Industrial

nevertheless stubbornly continued its separate defense.

(R. 906-

07, 3666, Appellant's Brief Add. 24-25, 50); Appellee's Brief,
pages

8-9.

Industrial

incurred

approximately

$71,500.00

in

attorneys' fees between Mr. Brown's August 25, 1987 request for retender, and August 2, 1991, the date Industrial re-tendered its
defense to Hood.

(Ex.

P-l).

Industrial's incurrence of these

fees was unreasonable especially in light of

(1) Mr. Brown's

request for re-tender, and (2) the execution of the Stipulation.
At page 13 of its brief, Industrial asserts:
with the exception of the period between
James' rejection of Industrial's tender and
the
Stipulation
reached
with
Hood,
Industrial's counsel was involved only in
monitoring the case, responding to discovery
requests from plaintiff, participating in
settlement discussion or filing motions and
otherwise rendering assistance or expertise
requested by James or Hood relating to
Industrial's independent surety defenses and
in support of general defense strategy.
Industrial's assertion is incorrect. Prior to June 25, 1987, (the
date James rejected

Industrial's tender), Industrial incurred

attorneys' fees for attendance at depositions, trial preparation
and other matters not mentioned
synopsis.

See Ex. P-l.

by Industrial

in the above

The attorneys' fees Industrial incurred

during this period totalled approximately $21,825.87, the majority
12

of which were incurred through excessive and unreasonable fees for
"monitoring the case".
After

the

Stipulation,

Industrial

continued

to

incur

additional attorneys7 fees of approximately $88,000 (Ex. P-l).
Yetf its own billing records belie Industrial's characterization of
those fees.

Even after the Stipulation, Industrial continued to

attend depositions and perform other work not indicated above.
Industrial's arguments do not support the trial court's
finding that Industrial acted reasonably in maintaining a separate
defense throughout the Litigation.

Hood has never contended

Industrial should receive none of its attorneys' fees.

The trial

court abused its discretion in failing to exercise any discretion
in evaluating Industrial's request.

For these reasons, the trial

court's entry of finding of fact no. 14 was an abuse of discretion
and must be reversed.4
E. The Trial Court's Aw^rd of Attorneys' Pees for
Duplicative and Redundant Legal Services Was Improper as a Matter
of Law
Industrial argues that the trial court made no finding of
fact or conclusion or law that Industrial incurred duplicative or
unnecessary legal services.

See Appellee's Brief, page 35.

Because Hood claims the trial court committed an error of law in
awarding Industrial fees for duplicative work, See Appellant's

industrial does not directly confront Hood's arguments
concerning the trial court's abuse of discretion in its Finding No.
25. Rather than repeating that argument here, Hood directs the
Court's attention to pages 25-30 of its initial brief.
13

Brief, pages

30-36, the presence of

absence of findings or

conclusions is legally irrelevant.5
Hood identified various occurrences of duplicative or
redundant representation by Industrial's counsel for which the
trial court approved the recovery of attorneys' fees.

See id.

Industrial does not challenge or distinguish the legal authorities
cited by Hood establishing the inability of an indemnitee to
recover

attorneys'

services.

fees

for

duplicative

or

redundant

legal

As a matter of law, Industrial's recovery of attorneys'

fees must be limited to those reasonably and necessarily incurred
and not for duplicative or redundant representation.
Of particular concern are the 11 depositions attended by
counsel for James and by Industrial's separate counsel.

The

undisputed authority cited by Hood establishes that a surety cannot
recover attorneys' fees incurred for attending depositions if such
fees pay for duplicative services simultaneously being rendered by
the principal's counsel.

See Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel &

Dock Co., 60 Ohio App.2d 248, 396 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (App. 1978).

In addition, 5 of the 11 depositions occurred after the April 4,
1988 stipulation date Industrial identifies at page 8 of its
Appellee's Brief.

(R. 3366-81). Under the Stipulation, Industrial

relied solely on Hood's financial strength as its guarantor in the
litigation.

(R. 906-07, Appellant's Brief Add. 24-25). Industrial

5

This is not an issue of fact as suggested by Industrial;
rather, it is an issue of law reviewed under a correction of error
standard.
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had no risk and, therefore, no reasonable basis for attending those
depositions.
Industrial cannot recover attorneys' fees expended for
its counsel's unproductive attendance at depositions relating to
Hood's and James' defenses or for other duplicative or redundant
legal services.6
P. The Trial Court's Award of Prejudgment Interest was
Improper.
Hood established in its initial brief that the abuse of
discretion

standard

used

to

review

an

award

of

reasonable

attorneys' fees is incompatible with an award of prejudgment
interest. Industrial does not in any way address or challenge this
incompatibility.

Instead,

Industrial

argues

that

indemnity

agreements are in some way different, making them an exception to
controlling

legal

principles.

To

the

contrary,

indemnity

agreements are not exceptions to the legal rules set forth in
Hood's initial brief.
In Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 136061 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), two
6

At page 34 of its Brief, Industrial confuses Mr. Mariger's
testimony concerning the reasonableness of attorneys' fees incurred
as a result of a request for assistance. Judge Young asked Mr.
Mariger if counsel for James requested Industrial's assistance, are
Industrial's attorneys' fees incurred in response to such a request
reasonable? Mr. Mariger responded that he "would have a hard time
saying it was unreasonable . . . " M r . Mariger further said,
however, he could not believe Mr. Brown requested Industrial's
assistance at the very time he requested Industrial to re-tender
its defense. (R.3776-7). Mr. Mariger testified that Industrial's
refusal to re-tender and subsequent negotiations to reduce
Industrial's involvement through the Stipulation evidence Mr.
Brown's attempt to remove Industrial from the defense of the
Litigation. Id.
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defendants appealed the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees
pursuant to an indemnity agreement.

That agreement provided

indemnity "'from any and all claims and loss . . . including
attorneys' fees . . . arising from claims' made by" the plaintiff.
Id. at 1360. The indemnitees argued evidence of reasonableness was
unnecessary because the fee request was made pursuant to an
indemnity agreement.

The trial court, however, denied the fee

request because there was no evidence to support it.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held: "We
see no basis for distinguishing a request for attorney fees under
an indemnity provision from a request under an attorney fee
provision."

Id.

at

1361

(emphasis

added).

In

addition,

authorities cited by Hood in its initial brief specifically deny
prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees arising in an indemnity
context.
In United States v. Hardage. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993),
the trial court found a hazardous waste transporter/indemnitor
liable

for

attorneys'

generator/indemnitee
provisions.

fees

incurred

pursuant

to

See Id. at pp. 1432-36.

by

a

various

hazardous

waste

indemnification

The trial court awarded the

hazardous waste generator/indemnitee all requested attorneys' fees.
The appellate court reversed

and remanded

that award

for a

determination of the reasonableness of those attorneys' fees. See
Id. at 1436-37.
The trial court also awarded—as did the trial court in this
action—prejudgment interest on all attorneys fees from the time of
16

each payment.

It did so pursuant to Oklahoma law functionally

identical to the rule in Utah.7 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial courts

prejudgment

interest award, holding:
An award of attorneys' fees is not a sum
certain where the reasonableness of those fees
is still to be determined by the trial court.
. . Because we hold that the district court
must determine the reasonableness of the legal
expenses underlying the [attorneys' fees]
assessments, the district court's award of
prejudgment interest is reversed.
Id. at p. 1438.
In Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Drake, 27 Wash.App. 2d 529, 618
P.2d 1341 (App. 1980) the employee of a construction subcontractor
was injured. The employee sued the general contractor for damages
and

the

general

contractor

tendered

the

defense

to

the

subcontractor/employer pursuant to an indemnity agreement.

The

subcontractor/employer refused to defend the lawsuit as required by
its indemnity agreement, and the general contractor/indemnitee was
required to hire its own attorneys at an expense of $76,797.90 as
set

by

the

jury.

See

contractor/indemnitee
employee's action.

was

id.

at

p.

successful

in

1345.
its

The
defense

general
of

the

See id. at p. 1342.

After the employee's suit was concluded, the subcontractor
sued the contractor to recover money the subcontractor contended it

7

0kla.Stat.Ann. tit. 23 § 6 (West 1987) provides: "any person
who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being
made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is
vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover
interest thereon from that day, . . ." Id. at p. 1438.
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spent to replace and repair towers damaged in the employee's
accident.

See id.

The contractor counterclaimed to recover,

pursuant to the indemnification agreement, expenses it incurred in
its defense of the employee's suit. The trial court dismissed the
subcontractor's complaint, and granted the contractor's indemnity
claim against the subcontractor.

See id.

However, the trial court denied prejudgment interest on the
award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the indemnity agreement. See
id. at p. 1345.

In affirming the trial court's denial of

prejudgment interest, the Washington Court of Appeals held:
Prejudgment interest may be awarded
(1) when an amount claimed is liquidated,
or (2) when the amount claimed is
unliquidated
and
this
amount
is
determinable by computation with reference
to a fixed standard contained in the
contract.
A claim is unliquidated if the principal must
be arrived
at by a determination of
reasonableness.
The question of reasonableness of the
attorneys' fees expended by Drake was
determined by the jury.
Until that was
resolved
by the jury, the claim was
unliquidated.
. . therefore prejudgment
interest on attorneys' fees was properly
denied by the trial court.
Id. at p. 1346 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Industrial is wrong in its unsupported assertion
that prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees is somehow treated
differently in an indemnity context.
Similarly, Industrial is wrong in its argument, at page 39 of
its brief, that its attorneys' fee payments were liquidated.

Numerous authorities

establish that the amount of reasonable

attorneys' fees is unliquidated until the trier of fact makes a
determination of reasonableness.

See, e.g., Tri-M. 618 P.2d at p.

1346; ALI v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 5 Ohio App.3d 105, 449 N.E.2d
495, 499 (App. 1982); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
487 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1973).
Furthermore, Industrial is once again wrong when it asserts,
at page 39 of its brief, that the trial court employed "no
guesswork or estimation in the total of the fees incurred. . ." As
Hood set forth at page 29 of its initial brief, the trial court
exhibited guesswork in the extreme in its award of Industrial's
reasonable attorneys fees:

"I either take [$]51,000.00 or I take

[$]122,000.00 if I buy the argument that they [Industrial] aren,t
entitled to any interest and I minus from that $5,000.00 plus or
minus for the errors in it, or I take $171,000.00.
of them strikes me as being somewhat arbitrary.
three." (R. 3800)(emphasis added).

Now every one
Any one of the

Whether viewed from a purely

legal standpoint, or from the trial court's own perception that any
particular award of attorneys' fees in this case would be "somewhat
arbitrary," Industrial's attorneys' fees were not liquidated.
Finally, at page 40 of its brief, Industrial invites the Court
to picture a parade of horribles whereby any indemnitor could avoid
interest merely by challenging the "reasonableness" of attorneys'
fees.

Industrial drafted the Stipulation, which provided Hood

would be liable only for Industrial's "reasonable" attorneys' fees.
If

sureties/indemnitees

such

as
19

Industrial

want

to

avoid a

challenge to the reasonability of the attorneys' fees they elect to
incur, they may
providing
attorneys'

that
fees

include a provision
an

indemnitor

incurred,

will

without

in indemnity

pay

all

regard

of

to

agreements

the

surety's

reasonableness.

Sureties similarly could insert a provision whereby the indemnitor
specifically agrees that all attorneys' fees incurred by a surety
are conclusively established as a liability of the indemnitor.
Sureties may insert a provision requiring indemnitors to pay some
fixed

amount,

liquidated

in

advance.

Under

any

of

these

provisions, Utah law would authorize an award of prejudgment
interest.

Industrial did not, however, utilize

a provision

liquidating the attorneys' fees it chose to incur.
Industrial relies on only two cases in fashioning its argument
regarding prejudgment interest. Those cases have no application to
this appeal.
P.2d

475

Both Worthington & Kimball v. C & A Dev. Co. , 777

(Utah

1989) and Morrison-Knudsen

Co. , Inc. v. The

Makahuena Corp.. 66 Haw. 663, 675 P.2d 760 (1983) have nothing to
do with either attorneys' fees or prejudgment interest.

Both of

these cases involved arbitrations, and the unique set of rules
applicable in the arbitration context. As noted by the Worthington
Court, American Arbitration Association Rule 43 provides that
11

'[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which is just and

equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the parties.'"
Worthington. 777 P.2d at p. 478. The Worthington Court held only
that this rule, along with language in the contract between the
parties providing that "unpaid sums due thereunder shall bear
20

interest at the rate paid on the construction loan or at the legal
rate, whichever is greater/' justified the arbitrator's award of
15% interest for reimbursement of out-of-pocket interest payments.
Similarly, Makahuena involved a challenge only to the amount of
post-judgment interest. Neither of these cases has any relevance
to this appeal.
(j.

Industrial is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Pees (in Appeal
In its separate February 17, 1994 Motion and Memorandum

for Award of Attorneys Fees on Appeal and Remand to Trial Court to
Assess Amount, Industrial asks this Court to award Industrial its
attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. Numerous authorities establish
that this Court should deny Industrial its attorneys' fees on
appeal, even if it should prevail.
The Washington Supreme Court stated the rule that defeats
Industrial's request:
We have not heretofore had occasion to
consider whether attorneys' fees attributable
solely to litigation of the indemnity issue
itself are recoverable.
The general, and
virtually unanimous rule appears to limit the
allowance of such fees to the defense of the
claim indemnified against and not to extend
such allowance for services rendered in
establishing the right to indemnification. 41
Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 36 (Supp.1974); 42
C.J.S. Indemnity § 13d (1944).
We hold,
therefore, that, in the absence of express
contractual terms to the contrary, an
indemnitee may not recover legal fees incurred
in establishing his right to indemnification.
Jones v. Strom Construction Co., 84 Wash.2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115,
1119 (1974)(emphasis added). See also. Amazi v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.f 249 Mont. 355, 816 P.2d 431, 434-35 (1991)(the majority rule
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is that a party is not entitled to its fees and costs incurred in
establishing its right to indemnity); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. The
Barge W-701. 654 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981) cert, denied. 455
U.S. 944 (1982)(joining with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
of the United States Court of Appeals in holding that, under a
general indemnity agreement, an indemnitee enjoys no right to
recover its legal fees incurred in establishing its right to
indemnification); Ranger Const. Co. v. Prince William Cnty. School
Bd., 605 F.2d 1298, 1304-05 (4th Cir. 1979); Simko v. C & C Marine
Maint. Co. , 594 F.2d 960, 968-69 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
833 (1989)(both to the same effect).
Yet another United States Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Second, has explained the reason for this rule:
Indemnity obligations, whether imposed by
contract or by law, require the indemnitor to
hold the indemnitee harmless from costs in
connection with a particular class of claims.
Legal fees and expenses incurred in defending
an indemnified claim are one such cost and
thus fall squarely within the obligation to
indemnify. . . . Such reasoning does not apply
to fees and expenses incurred in establishing
the existence of an obligation to indemnify,
since such expenses are not by their nature a
part of the claim indemnified against.
Rather, they are costs incurred in suing for a
breach of contract, to wit, the failure to
indemnify.
As such, fees and expenses
incurred
in establishing
the
indemnity
obligation fall within the ordinary rule
requiring a party to bear his own expenses of
litigation,
see
Berger,
Court
Awarded
Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable11?. 126
U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 281 (1977). Cf. 5 Corbin,
Contracts § 1037 (1964)(attorneys' fees and
expenses may be covered if they constitute
damages from the breach of a contract but not
if they are incurred in proving the breach.)
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Of course, when, as here, the obligation to
indemnify arises out of a contract, the rule
that an indemnitee cannot recover the costs of
establishing the right to indemnification does
not apply if "the agreement explicitly states
otherwise."
However, while the indemnity
clause of Massport's contract with Italian
Line, quoted above, contains the phrase,
"including but not limited to cost of suit and
attorneys7 fees," these words are more
naturally construed as referring to legal
expenses incurred in defending against the
primary claim.
Merely including the words
"attorneys'
fees"
among
the
expenses
indemnified against in the main action cannot
reasonably be viewed as causing a shifting of
fees in an action to establish the obligation
to indemnify.
Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. "Hermes", 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2nd Cir.
1985).
In Amazi v. Atlantic Richfield Co., an indemnitee sought
indemnity totalling

$70,250.75.

Of this sum, $50,449.51 was

expended in defending the case. The remaining $19,801.24 was spent
in trying to secure indemnity. The trial court awarded the amounts
incurred

in defending the case, and disallowed

all sums the

indemnitee incurred in securing indemnity.
The indemnitee claimed its entitlement to attorneys' fees
incurred in attempting to secure indemnity arose from the following
indemnity provision:
If indemnity is required by any of the terms
of this Agreement, the responsible party shall
defend the other and pay all settlements,
judgments,
costs,
including
reasonable
attorneys fees, and other related expenses
similar or dissimilar to the foregoing.
Id. at p. 435.

23

On appeal the indemnitee

argued

that

such

"related

expenses" include attorneys' fees incurred in establishing its
contractual right to indemnification.

In doing so, the indemnitee

cited the rule that contracts for indemnification
liberally

construed

indemnified.

in

favor

of

the

party

are to be

intended

to

be

See id.

In rejecting the defendant's arguments, and affirming the
trial court, the Montana Supreme Court held:
While contracts of indemnity are to be
liberally
construed
in
favor
of
the
indemnitee, the provision here is not in and
of itself such a contract. Rather it is a
contract term allowing for recovery of certain
attorneys' fees. Under the majority rule just
adopted, such a term must be express in order
for an indemnitee to recover legal fees
incurred
in establishing
its right to
indemnification.
We conclude that the
provision here is not sufficiently express,
and affirm the District Court's adoption of
the majority rule regarding such fees.
Id (emphasis provided by the Amazi court).
In addressing the issue in the context of appeals, the
Arizona Court of Appeals indicated why Industrial's request cannot
succeed:
[Indemnitee] has asked for its attorney's fees
on appeal because the matter arises from
contract. Under general indemnity principles,
[indemnitee] would have no right to fees: the
right of indemnity includes a right to
attorney's fees incurred in defending the
underlying claim, but does not include the
right to fees incurred in establishing the
right of indemnity.
INA Ins. Co. of N. America v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 248,
722 P.2d 975, 983

(App. 1986).
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Similarly, Industrial cannot

prevail on its request for attorneys' fees on appeal because it can
point to no sufficiently express contractual provision permitting
it to recover attorneys' fees incurred in establishing its right to
indemnification.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court's judgment, and disallow Industrial's requested attorneys'
fees on appeal.
DATED this \(p

day of March, 1994.
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